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In the 27 years that have passed since the McLaren, Kaye and Mackintosh (MKM) model of 
perceptual learning was first proposed, it has undergone considerable theoretical development and 
been subject to extensive empirical test. But we would argue that the basic principles of the theory 
remain as valid today as they were in 1989. One of these principles was that salience modulation of 
stimulus representations based on prediction error was a key component of latent inhibition and 
perceptual learning. It was this modification of what was otherwise a fairly basic adaptation of the 
model for categorisation proposed by McCleland and Rumelhart (M&R) that transformed a system 
that would exhibit enhanced generalisation as category learning progressed, into one that would 
instead offer an improved capacity for discrimination between exemplars as a consequence of 
experience with the category. This modification has only been tested indirectly up until now, by 
looking at the predictions that flow from it and then comparing them to animal and human 
discrimination following stimulus pre-exposure. In this chapter we test this principle more directly, by 
using tDCS to disrupt the modulation of salience by prediction error, and show that when this is done, 
people exhibit the enhanced generalisation predicted by the standard M&R model. We conclude that 




How we learn to distinguish between things is one of the basic questions for cognitive 
psychology. This paper focuses on two aspects of the mechanisms that allow us to do this. 
Categorisation in this paper refers to our ability to classify stimuli as members of one category or 
another as a result of trial and error training with members (exemplars) of the categories in question. 
Perceptual learning here refers to our enhanced ability to discriminate between certain stimuli as a 
consequence of experience with them or stimuli like them. Taken together, these two phenomena play 
a crucial role in learning to correctly identify stimuli as members of a particular class, and not confuse 
one stimulus with another similar one.  
There are many theories and models of categorisation, and quite a few theories and models 
of perceptual learning. One of the few models that addresses both was originally proposed by 
McLaren, Kaye and Mackintosh (1989, henceforth MKM) in part as a response to and development of 
McClelland and Rumelhart's (1985, henceforth M&R) connectionist model of categorisation. It is this 
model that motivated the experiments discussed here, and, given the model-driven nature of our 
enquiry, we begin with a brief introduction to these models and the experimental paradigms we will 
use in this paper. We then go on to discuss how recent work using tDCS (trans-cranial Direct Current 
Stimulation) raises the possibility of influencing the error signal that drives learning and performance 
in the MKM model so as to change participant's ability to distinguish between stimuli as a 
consequence of their experience with them. Our paper is an exploration of this possibility, and our 
results suggest both that perceptual learning and categorisation can be strongly influenced by anodal 
tDCS to frontal regions of the brain, and that a theory of perceptual learning and categorisation that 
relies on use of error-based modulation of the salience of the representations of stimulus input 
provides a good fit to the data we obtain using this preparation. We end by discussing the implications 




McClelland and Rumelhart's seminal 1985 paper used the delta rule, an error correcting 
learning algorithm closely related to Rescorla-Wagner, (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) in a 
connectionist network employing distributed stimulus representations to model categorisation. We 
cannot do the model full justice here, but it was also noteworthy for its use of non-linear activation 
functions and a weight decay mechanism to help it produce both prototype and exemplar effects in 
what was effectively a single-layer (in that it has a single layer of modifiable weights) connectionist 
model. It did have one feature, however, that seemed to some of us problematic. This was that the 
learning algorithm coupled with the activation function inevitably led to units that were most frequently 
co-activated becoming more active as a consequence. This gave these units greater salience in later 
learning, and so it would be the units representing the more prototypical elements of a stimulus that 
would tend to form the strongest links to other units representing category membership.  
This characteristic of the model may not be a problem for categorisation (though we will have 
more to say about this later) but it is certainly a problem for stimulus representation development as a 
consequence of experience with a category, i.e. for perceptual learning. McLaren, Leevers and 
Mackintosh (1994) were the first to show that humans trained to distinguish between two prototype-
defined categories of stimuli (in this case chequerboards) were then actually better able to distinguish 
between two new exemplars drawn from one of these now familiar categories than between two 
exemplars taken from another entirely novel category that otherwise had a similar prototype-defined 
structure. The McClelland and Rumelhart model predicts the opposite result because, as illustrated in 
the lower half of Figure 1, it will be the prototypical features contained within these new exemplars 
drawn from the familiar category that will be most salient. This will lead to the two exemplars being 
represented as more rather than less similar as a consequence, because these will tend to be the 
features shared by the two exemplars. 
Figure 1 about here please 
Our solution to this problem is shown in Figure 1 (top half), which illustrates how the MKM 
theory predicts salience will change as a function of experience with exemplars of one category. The 
crucial difference between this model and that of McClelland and Rumelhart (1985) is that the 
activation of the units representing stimulus features (or elements as we will often call them) is 
modulated by their error. Thus, if a unit is relatively unpredicted by other active units, but is externally 
activated because a feature corresponding to that unit has occurred and been perceived in the 
environment, then it's activation (i.e. salience for learning purposes) will be high because its error 
score will also be high. Conversely, if a unit receiving external input is well-predicted by other active 
units such that its error score is low, then its activation (and salience) will be low. This is exactly the 
opposite of the effect that occurs in the M&R model, and leads to new exemplars drawn from a 
familiar, prototype-defined category being more easily discriminated, because the elements or 
features they share in common will be relatively low in salience, thus reducing stimulus similarity. The 
elements on which they differ (which will tend to be those elements that have changed from the 
prototype) will be relatively salient and this helps in learning to discriminate between them as 
McLaren, Leevers and Mackintosh (1994) found. 
The illustrations in Figure 1 are similar to those of a figure in McLaren (1997) that is also used 
to explain how experience with exemplars drawn from a prototype-defined category will lead to better 
within-category discrimination. This 1997 paper, however, deals with one of the first reports of an 
analogue of the face inversion effect using artificial categories (again chequerboards) rather than 
faces. McLaren first trained participants to learn (by trial and error) to categorize chequerboard 
exemplars as belonging to one of two prototype-defined sets. The exemplars were made from the 
prototypes by randomly changing some of the black and white squares that made up the 
chequerboard that defined the category prototype, as in McLaren, Leevers and Mackintosh (1994). 
McLaren (1997) then demonstrated that an inversion effect could be obtained for new exemplars 
drawn from these now familiar categories, a result since replicated repeatedly by Civile, Zhao, Ku, 
Elchlepp, Lavric and McLaren (2014). The explanation for this result is that the exposure to the 
exemplars of the categories participants were trained on initially allows perceptual learning to take 
place as in McLaren et al (1994), and this then improves discrimination and recognition performance 
to exemplars drawn from those categories that are in the usual upright orientation; but does not help, 
and as Civile et al (2014) argue, actually hinders discrimination and recognition when these 
exemplars are inverted. This explanation depends on the MKM account of perceptual learning and 
categorisation, as the M&R model would once again predict the converse result.  
There is thus some good evidence for the MKM modification of the M&R model of 
categorisation. We will use the categorisation followed by discrimination/recognition procedure just 
discussed later in this paper to test our hypotheses regarding the effects of frontal anodal tDCS 
stimulation on perceptual learning. But before doing this, we first consider the prior issue of what 
tDCS might be able to offer in terms of influencing categorisation itself, and how tDCS might affect the 
type of error-based modulation that is the basis of the MKM model. 
tDCS and Categorisation 
Our first experiment investigates the effects of tDCS  on a standard categorisation task that 
produces a prototype effect under normal circumstances (Posner and Keele, 1968). This work was 
inspired by the finding of Ambrus, Zimmer, Kincses, Harza, Kovacs, Paulus and Antal (2011) who 
provided evidence that tDCS could eliminate the prototype effect. There is other evidence that 
stimulation of PFC using tDCS can influence categorisation. Lupyan, Mirman, Hamilton and 
Thompson-Shill (2012) have produced some evidence that stimulation in frontal regions can enhance 
categorisation, and Kincses, Antal, Nitsche, Bártfai and Paulus (2003) have shown that when tDCS 
anodal stimulation was delivered over the left PFC (Fp3), probabilistic classification learning (PCL) 
was improved. Ambrus et al (2011), however, found that anodal tDCS, applied to Fp3 during the 
training phase (and beginning 8 minutes before the training phase started) had a significant and quite 
different impact on categorisation performance in their version of the prototype distortion task. They 
obtained a significant decrease in performance accuracy in identifying prototype and low-distortion 
patterns as category members in the anodal group compared to the sham group. This is a striking 
aspect of their results as it is contrary to most studies that show increased performance when anodal 
tDCS is applied to task-relevant cortical areas during task execution (e.g., Fregni, Boggio, Nitsche, 
Bermpohl, Antal, Feredoes, 2005). 
On close inspection, one possible interpretation of Ambrus et al's result is that anodal tDCS 
has reduced learning to the prototype, and increased generalisation to random patterns. This would 
have the effect of eliminating any prototype effect, and is exactly the type of pattern we would expect 
if the MKM model were to be transformed into the M&R version. Salience modulation enhances 
learning of novel stimuli, and so improves early acquisition of category discrimination, and it also 
reduces generalisation. Losing this type of modulation would lead to slower learning (at least initially) 
and greater generalisation. We speculated that anodal tDCS to Fp3 might have disrupted salience 
modulation by means of prediction error leading to Ambrus et al's result. 
If we now consider how tDCS might influence the brain's computation and use of prediction 
error, Reinhart and Woodman (2014) in a recent paper have shown that anodal tDCS over frontal 
regions can change prediction error. They used anodal stimulation at FCz and were able to show that 
this produced enhanced learning and selectively enhanced neural correlates of prediction error. The 
most obvious conclusion to draw from this study is that 1.5 mA anodal stimulation applied with their 
electrode montage has the effect of amplifying prediction error, which will both speed learning and 
lead to the neural signature they found. This is not the effect we postulated in response to Ambrus et 
al's data, but it does suggest that prediction error can be influenced by anodal tDCS, and of course 
the locus of stimulation is rather different in Reinhart et al's work. 
Our approach in the studies reported in this paper is to take something from the approaches 
of Ambrus et al's (2011) - because they were able to influence categorisation quite directly - whilst 
holding that of Reinhart et al (2014) in mind - because they have good evidence for changing 
prediction error. Hence we employed a similar electrode montage to that use by Ambrus et al (2011) 
stimulating Fp3, and increased the current from the 1mA they used to 1.5 mA in the hope of 
maximising our chance of observing an effect on categorisation. If we were to observe such an effect, 
then we would consider the possibility that this effect would be due to our changing the contribution of 
prediction error in influencing learning and performance on the categorisation task. In this way we 
hoped to develop a procedure that would allow us to both influence categorisation and the perceptual 
learning that follows on from categorisation, which in turn would allow us to probe the mechanisms 
underlying both, using the MKM modification of M&R as our starting point for interpreting our results. 
Note that our procedure, which is akin to that used in earlier studies, employs electrodes (see later) 
that do not have a strongly focal effect, so that the stimulation we provide is perhaps best functionally 
described as Left DLPFC rather than trying to claim any greater specificity. 
 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 is a conceptual replication of Ambrus et al (20111), using a classic 
categorisation paradigm based on early work by Posner and Keele (1968) and Homa, Sterling and 
Treppel (1981) designed to reveal any prototype effect. We use three prototype-defined categories of 
chequerboards, with the exemplars in each category generated by adding noise (randomly changing a 
certain number of squares) of the prototype for that category. Participants are trained to classify 
exemplars into these three categories by trial and error, and then tested on exemplars and the 
prototypes (which are never shown in training) to allow us to determine if an exemplar effect has 
occurred. Three types of stimulation, Anodal, Cathodal and Sham are used, but all employ the same 
Fp3 electrode placement used by Ambrus et al. 
Method 
Participants:  50 University of Exeter students (17 male) with a mean age of 21.5 years (sd 2.93) 
participated in the study. Two were excluded before analysis due to procedural complications leaving 
48.  
Stimuli: These were 16x16 chequerboards containing approximately 50% black and 50% white 
squares. Four prototypes were created that were constrained to share 50% of their squares with one 
another, and also to consist of relatively clearly demarcated regions of black and white. This was 
achieved by making the colour of a given square depend on that of its near neighbours. Thus, if they 
were predominantly black then it was likely to be black, and vice-versa if the neighbours were 
predominantly white.  Exemplars were generated by adding noise. A randomly chosen 96 squares 
would be set at random in a given prototype to generate an exemplar of that category, so that on 
average 48 squares are changed from the category prototype (see Figure 2). In this way as many 
exemplars as were desired could be created. We used a total of 128 chequerboard exemplars from 
each of the four categories in these experiments, though not all of these stimuli would be used for a 
given participant. The stimuli used in the experimental phases (categorisation and test) were 
counterbalanced across subjects. 
Participants were required to separate these chequerboard stimuli into three categories (A, B 
and C) during the training and test phases (see Figure 2). In the training phase, 64 novel exemplars 
from each of the three categories were presented to participants in a randomized order. In the test 
phase, 10 of these previously seen exemplars from each category were presented to participants 
along with 10 novel chequerboard stimuli from each of the three categories and the three previously 
unseen category prototypes. The prototype stimuli were presented twice each during test. Participants 
made category responses to stimuli using the “C”, “V” and “B” keys on a keypad. 
Figure 2 about here please 
tDCS: This was delivered by a battery driven constant current stimulator (Neuroconn) using two 
electrodes covered by 5cm x 7cm pieces of pre-dampened synthetic sponge. One electrode montage 
was used: the first electrode (to which polarity refers) was placed over the left PFC (Fp3) and the 
reference electrode was placed on the forehead above the right eye. First electrode placement was 
determined by locating the Cz for each of the subjects (half the distance between the inion and nasion 
areas) and then moving 7 cm anterior relative to the Cz and 9cm to its left (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3 about here please 
Current was applied 1.5 min before the participants began the categorisation task (whilst listening to 
instructions) and from then on making 10 min stimulation in total. tDCS was delivered with an intensity 
of 1.5mA, and a fade-in and fade-out of 5 sec for the Anodal and Cathodal groups. Sham received the 
same 5 sec fade-in and fade-out, but only 30 sec stimulation between them, which terminated before 
categorisation commenced. A double blind procedure was used, by having two experimenters, one 
(primary) who actually ran the participant, and another (secondary) who set up the stimulation 
according to specifications provided by a third party. The connections to the stimulator were 
concealed by the secondary experimenter so that neither primary experimenter nor participant could 
determine the polarity of stimulation. In Experiment 1 we compared Anodal, Cathodal and Sham 
groups.  
Design and procedure: In a between-subjects design the 48 participants were randomly assigned to 
one of 3 conditions: anodal stimulation, cathodal stimulation, and sham. Thus, all conditions contained 
16 participants.  
Once participants had been set up for tDCS stimulation they were informed that they would 
see different black and white chequerboard stimuli that they had to categorise into category A, B or C, 
and were shown the three buttons on the keyboard that they were to use (‘C’, ‘V’ and ‘B’ respectively). 
After the tDCS stimulator was switched on, the participant then read through three screens of more 
detailed instructions about the task, which lasted approximately 1.5 minutes. The training phase then 
began which contained 192 novel category stimuli presented in three blocks of 64 randomized trials 
with self-paced breaks separating each block. After a fixation cross, one stimulus was presented for 3 
seconds during which the participant made their category response on the keyboard. The stimuli 
remained on the screen for the full 3 seconds. Feedback was presented after every trial. 
After the participant finished the training phase, the primary experimenter switched off the tDCS 
stimulator and informed participants that no current was now going through the electrodes. They were 
then informed that there was a final block to the task, using the same categories as before, but this 
time with no feedback. This test phase had 66 trials of randomised exemplar and prototype stimuli. 
Results 
The crucial dependent variable was mean accuracy proportion (out of 1) of category responding 
during the test phase of the experiment (Figure 4).  
Figure 4 about here please 
To examine the prototype effect, the difference between accuracy in responding to exemplar and 
prototype stimuli during test was investigated. The average accuracy in responding to exemplars 
during test was calculated for each participant, and the mean accuracy of responding to these 
exemplars was then subtracted from the accuracy in responding to the prototypes during test (Figure 
5). This difference was then added entered into a univariate analysis as a dependent variable with 
condition as the fixed factor. The main effect of condition on this measure of the prototype effect 
approached significance (p =. 081). There was no significant difference when comparing cathodal 
stimulation to Sham. However, when comparing the prototype effect in the anodal stimulation 
condition to the Sham control group there was a significant difference (p = .03) indicating that the 
prototype effect was smaller in the Anodal group. Comparing the prototype effect under anodal 
stimulation to the cathodal stimulation condition there was also a similar significant difference between 
conditions (p = .043), i.e. a greater prototype effect under cathodal stimulation compared with anodal 
stimulation. It is the lower accuracy on prototype trials in the anodal condition that seems to be driving 
these results. 
Figure 5 about here please 
Differences between exemplar and prototype response accuracy were also compared with the null 
hypothesis of a difference of zero between the two measures. There was no reliable difference found 
in the Anodal condition, however, Cathodal and Sham conditions both produced significant effects on 
this test (p < .05) indicating a significant prototype effect for these conditions (see Figure 5). 
Discussion 
Our results are broadly in line with those of Ambrus et al (2011), in that we have also shown 
that anodal stimulation at Fp3 leads to a significant reduction in, perhaps even elimination of, the 
prototype effect. Whilst accuracy scores are significantly higher for the prototype than for exemplars 
under Cathodal and Sham stimulation, this difference disappears under anodal stimulation and the 
difference between these differences (i.e. prototype effect for Anodal vs. prototype effect for Cathodal 
or for Shams) is also significant. Ambrus et al (2011) also found that anodal stimulation to left DPLFC 
eliminated a prototype effect that was otherwise significant in Sham controls, though in their case this 
was accompanied by significantly lower performance to prototypes in the Anodal condition relative to 
Shams as well, a result that is not significant in our data though the numerical trend is the same. Our 
results do allow us to extend Ambrus et al’s conclusions, however, as we have been able to show that 
cathodal stimulation is not different to sham stimulation with our procedures (Ambrus et al did not run 
a left DPLFC cathodal group). Thus, our effect is a selective one, in that only anodal stimulation of left 
DPLFC eliminated the prototype effect in our experiment. 
We will forgo further analysis of this result until we have reported the results of Experiment 2 
which also investigates the effects of tDCS to left DLPFC, but this time using a version of our 
categorisation task that is identical to that used in our earlier perceptual learning experiments (Civile 
et al, 2014).  
 
Experiment 2 
Here we carry out two replications of an experiment that exactly duplicates the categorisation 
training procedure adopted by McLaren (1997) and also used by Civile et al (2014). This was done in 
order that our results could be extrapolated to these perceptual learning experiments, allowing us to 
predict the consequences tDCS for perceptual learning in future experiments. In this procedure only 
two chequerboards are used as base patterns or prototypes (i.e. there are only two categories in 
play), and exemplars are generated from them as before by adding noise, which simply involves 
changing a random selection of the squares in the prototype. Participants are then trained to 
distinguish between exemplars drawn from these two categories using a trial and error procedure with 
feedback before being tested for classification accuracy to both category exemplars and their 
prototypes (which, as in Experiment 1, are never seen in training). Experiment 2a uses this paradigm 
and contrasts anodal tDCS to Fp3 in the Experimental group with a Sham control. Experiment 2b 
uses a cathodal stimulation group as the comparison with the Experimental group receiving anodal 
stimulation. The cathodal control has the advantage that stimulation occurs in exactly the same way 
as for anodal stimulation (but with reversed polarity). We took this opportunity to see if it would 
produce similar results to sham stimulation.  
Method 
 Stimuli: These were as before but only two prototype-defined categories were used (A and B 
in Figure 2). 
Participants: Experiments 2a and 2b each had 16 undergraduate participants per group and 
were run in Shanghai, China, at East China Normal University.  
tDCS: Stimulation was as in Experiment1. In Experiment 2a we compared Anodal and Sham 
groups. In Experiment 2b we compared Anodal and Cathodal groups. 
Categorisation task: Participants were asked to categorise chequerboards into two different 
categories (in this case A and C, see Figure 2). Chequerboards were presented one at a time for 
classification. They were presented for 4 seconds. Participants had to press either the "x" or the "." 
key to categorise the stimulus. The experiment moved to the next stimulus only after the 4 seconds 
had passed. Participants received feedback as to whether their response was correct or not.  128 
Exemplars were presented, 64 from category A and 64 from category C. In the test phase participants 
were asked to categorise chequerboards (self-paced) without feedback. They were given one 
presentation of eight old exemplars from each category (exemplars used in training), eight new 
exemplars from each category, and two presentations of both category prototypes. 
Results - Experiment 2a 
Figure 6 gives graphs of mean accuracy for Experiment 2a. A strong prototype effect was 
obtained under anodal tDCS, but was absent in the Sham group; p<.05 for comparisons between the 
prototype and mean performance on the exemplars in the anodal condition. The interaction for these 
effects with group (Anodal vs. Sham) did not, however, reach significance (p=.15). There is some 
evidence that the effect of anodal tDCS was to suppress performance to the exemplars, in that there 
was a significant difference between Anodal and Sham groups for the New exemplars, p=.042. 
Clearly, given our earlier results and those of Ambrus et al (2011), this set of data came as something 
of a surprise. Further interpretation of this result will be postponed, however, until we have considered 
the results of Experiment 2b. 
Figure 6 about here please 
Results - Experiment 2b 
Figure 7 gives the graphs for Experiment 2b. Once again a prototype effect was obtained 
under anodal tDCS, p=.005, but not under cathodal tDCS, which gave results very similar to those 
obtained in the Sham group of Experiment 2a. There was some evidence that the Anodal group 
prototype effect was significantly stronger than that in the Cathodal group, p=.078 for the interaction 
using the average of the two types of exemplar to compare to the prototype. There is also evidence 
that anodal tDCS suppresses test performance to exemplars, as there is a significant Group 
difference, this time for Old exemplars, p=.037. 
Figure 7 about here please 
 
Discussion 
Taken together, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that anodal tDCS reduces accuracy on 
test to exemplars in this type of categorisation task. It leaves performance to prototypes relatively 
unaffected, however, which leads to the emergence of a prototype effect when we compare 
performance on the prototype to that on other exemplars. Before accepting these conclusions, 
however, we acknowledge that there is an obvious issue with these results that makes their 
interpretation more difficult. Performance in the Sham or Cathodal groups is near ceiling, particularly 
for the prototypes. This makes it hard to tell whether the absence of any prototype effect in these 
groups is real - or is due to this ceiling effect. If it is the latter, then it may be that anodal tDCS simply 
reduces test accuracy below ceiling, allowing a prototype effect that was, in some sense, always there 
to emerge. Another possibility, however, is that anodal tDCS selectively enhances the prototype effect 
in these experiments, and that it's appearance is not a simple consequence of an overall reduction in 
performance allowing an effect that was present but masked to become visible. We will focus on this 
last possibility in what follows, as we have been unable to generate a plausible account of how anodal 
tDCS could reduce overall performance in the two category case, but selectively reduce performance 
to prototypes in the three category problem. 
On the face of it, the results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 appear to be incompatible. In 
Experiment 2, as we have just seen, we have evidence for anodal tDCS using our electrode montage 
producing a stronger prototype effect than that shown in our control groups (using either Sham or 
Cathodal stimulation). In Experiment 1 we obtained the converse pattern of results, the prototype 
effect in the Anodal group was this time significantly weaker (and actually absent) than in either Sham 
or Cathodal groups. It is true that because of the nature of the problems there are some parametric 
differences in stimulation between the two experiments. tDCS stimulation will have been active for 
about half of the training phase in Experiment 1, but the full training phase in Experiment 2. But this, 
on it's own, would seem an unlikely candidate to explain the opposite effects of the two experiments, 
and in any case the effects of tDCS stimulation are thought to last well beyond the active stimulation 
period.  So how are we to explain this pattern of results? 
We believe that the key to understanding this pattern lies first of all with the prototype effect 
(or lack of it) demonstrated in the control conditions where tDCS can be assumed to not have any 
significant influence. In the two category problem used for Experiment 2 there was no prototype effect 
in these control groups. In the three category problem used in Experiment 1 there was a significant 
prototype effect in both control groups. The stimuli and procedures in both experiments are the same, 
with the proviso that we used an extra category in Experiment 1, so this difference (no prototype effect 
vs. prototype effect) can most probably be ascribed to the use of three rather than two categories. 
This would have the effect of influencing performance levels not only because there are three possible 
choices instead of two, but also because the amount of generalisation between categories has 
increased (because now each test stimulus in the three category problem would be receiving 
generalisation from exemplars of two different categories in addition to members of its own category, 
rather than from just one).  
This extra generalisation between categories would also, somewhat paradoxically, produce a 
stronger perceptual learning effect for the three category problem than would be the case in the two 
category problem. The extra generalisation makes the perceptual discrimination between categories 
more difficult, but the perceptual learning effect addresses this issue, by enabling the representations 
of the exemplars and prototypes from the three categories to become more distinct, and consequently 
there is more scope for this effect to manifest in these circumstances We will go into considerable 
detail on exactly how this might be achieved shortly, but our argument is that this stronger perceptual 
learning effect in the three category problem is particularly marked between categories, making them 
more easily distinguishable from one another and this enhances the prototype effect.  
Our explanation of the results for the control conditions is thus based on a trade-off between 
generalisation between categories (which on its own reduces classification performance) and 
enhanced between-category perceptual learning, which we will argue assists classification of 
prototypes more than exemplars. In the two category problem the former effect dominates, and 
generalisation between categories is such that it counteracts any advantage that the prototype might 
have over other exemplars. In the three category problem the balance shifts, and now perceptual 
learning makes the categories more discriminable and the prototype effect emerges. We will show 
how this can happen shortly, but note that some explanation for this (reliable) difference between 
control conditions has to be given, and this is the most plausible account available to us. 
Our explanation of the results in the anodal tDCS conditions is that this stimulation abolishes 
perceptual learning leaving enhanced generalisation, both between and within categories. The effect 
of the enhanced generalisation within-category is to strengthen the prototype effect, but the effect of 
the between-category generalisation will be to reduce it. The first dominates in the two category 
problem, but the second is the more important factor in the three category problem because the 
amount of between category generalisation is doubled. Hence the prototype effect in the two category 
problem becomes detectable under anodal tDCS (and may be potentiated by a reduction in 
performance from ceiling - we cannot rule this out); but the prototype effect that was already 
detectable in the three category problem is reduced and becomes non-significant in the three 
category case. 
The analysis thus far may seem rather ad-hoc and designed to describe rather than explain 
our data. Note, however, that there has to be some explanation for the otherwise rather counter-
intuitive pattern of results obtained across Experiments 1 and 2, and that our explanation of the 
effects in the control groups follows from an application of the McLaren, Kaye and Mackintosh (1989) 
model of perceptual learning and categorisation and it's recent variants (McLaren and Mackintosh, 
2000; McLaren, Forrest and McLaren, 2012) discussed in our introduction. Our hypothesis is that the 
modulation of salience based on the error term that forms a vital part of MKM model is disrupted by 
anodal tDCS so that the model in essence reverts to McClelland and Rumelhart's (1985) model of 
categorisation inasmuch as perceptual learning or representation development is concerned. This 
hypothesis is explored in detail in the computational analysis that follows. 
 
Perceptual Learning and Categorisation under tDCS 
The top middle panel of Figure 8 shows how the salience (activation) of the elements 
(representations of sets of features) of each category prototype will be affected by experience of 
exemplars from categories A and C if we adopt the MKM approach to salience modulation via 
prediction error. Note that all the elements needed to represent all three categories (A, B and C) are 
shown for completeness, but that exposure is only given to two of them, A and C, for this example. 
Those elements that are more predictable and are more often encountered will be those with lower 
salience (darker shading). Thus, the elements shared by the A and C prototypes (abc and ac) are less 
salient than a or ab elements (only present in A). Given that exemplars from the B category are not 
pre-exposed in this example the b elements can only occur by virtue of the random noise added to 
construct exemplars from the prototypes. The right panel shows how the modulation of salience 
across elements changes when all three categories are experienced. In particular, the shared 
prototypical elements, abc, become even less salient. The effect is that discrimination between the 
three category prototypes is actually better than when only two categories were trained because 
perceptual learning is more effective. 
Figure 8 about here please 
The bottom panels of Figure 8 show what happens when the salience modulation mechanism 
in MKM is removed. The salience (activation) of elements representing the stimulus features now 
reverts to that in McClelland and Rumelhart's (1985) model of categorisation, with units receiving 
more internal input having higher (rather than lower as in MKM) activations. In effect, this gives the 
common elements an advantage that can be seen in both lower panels. They become increasingly 
salient, and this leads to very strong between and within-category generalisation. Table 1 gives the 
relative proportions of the different elements making up each stimulus for the average A exemplar and 
C exemplar as well as the A and C prototypes using a simple model that, as a first approximation, 
equates each square in a chequerboard with a feature. By combining this information with the 
expected salience of these elements shown in Figure 8, it is possible to get a sense of how much one 
stimulus will generalise to another as a result of categorisation training. 
Table 1 about here please 
We can see immediately that the MKM model predicts that exemplars will contain novel 
(noise) elements that are of relatively high salience, and that the prototypical elements will be more 
numerous, but less salient. The prototypes are exclusively composed of relatively low salience 
prototypical elements and do not overlap as much as exemplars drawn from the two categories. The 
consequence of this is that generalisation from say the trained A exemplars to C exemplars will be 
somewhat greater than to the C prototype. This effect is symmetrical (the C exemplars generalise to 
the A exemplars to the same extent), and so the chance of mistakenly calling an A exemplar a 
member of the C category will be somewhat greater than that of calling the A prototype a member of 
the C category. 
Table 2 gives the calculated expected generalisation (based on Figure 8 and Table 1) to/from 
trained A exemplars to each of the four stimulus types considered in our earlier table, and it confirms 
our analysis. If we begin by looking at the 2 Categories MKM column of the table, it shows (perhaps 
rather surprisingly) that the generalisation from one of the trained A exemplars to this typical A 
exemplar (.609) will be greater than that stimulus' generalisation from (or to) the A prototype (.596), 
but the difference between these values is not large. We can estimate the generalisation that occurs 
on average from the C category exemplars and the C prototype to/from this A exemplar by looking at 
the C prototype and C exemplar rows of the table. These give generalisation from an A exemplar to 
these stimuli, but by symmetry they give us the values we will require for our calculations. Thus, the 
generalisation from C exemplars to an A exemplar (.430) will be considerably greater than the 
generalisation from the C prototype to A exemplars (.340), which is also the value for generalisation 
from C exemplars to the A prototype. The result is a larger difference in generalisation for the A 
prototype to the A category exemplars compared to the C category exemplars (.596 - .340 = .256) 
than for the A exemplars to the same stimuli (.609 - .430 = .179). In other words, it predicts a 
prototype advantage, but does it predict a detectable prototype effect?  
Table 2 about here please 
To answer this question we need to convert generalisation into choice. The models 
themselves do not stipulate the requisite decision mechanisms to function as stand-alone classifiers. 
Hence we used a minimalistic approach to converting generalisation into choice behaviour that was 
simply designed to demonstrate that the MKM model could produce the correct pattern for the two 
and three category problems in the control groups, and that this would then change appropriately 
when error modulation of salience was disrupted. We employed a standard form of Luce's choice rule, 
using the exponential of the generalisation coefficient as our measure of category membership. 
1. 𝑃 𝐴 =  !!"!!"! !!" 
Where P(A) is the probability of classifying a stimulus as a member of category A, a is the summed 
generalisation to that stimulus from trained A exemplars, c is the summed generalisation from trained 
C exemplars, and  k is a constant that captures the weight given to generalisation in a given task. We 
then needed to find k for our model. For the 2 Categories MKM coefficients we simply chose k so that 
it gave a ballpark fit to the accuracy data for the exemplars in our experiments (and we used this 
procedure for the other data as well). We adopted a value of 11, which resulted in P(A) for the 
prototypes being 0.94, and P(A) for exemplars being 0.88. These are a reasonable fit to the actual 
values across the two experiments, which are 0.94 and 0.925 respectively, though clearly the model 
value for the exemplars is a little low. 
One point to make here about this very simple model is that we are simply assuming that each square 
in a chequerboard is a feature. This may be a useful approximation to reality for our purposes, but it 
completely fails to capture the fact that the prototypes (which were constrained to have regions of 
nearly all black or nearly all white) looked distinctly different to the exemplars, even those from their 
own category, which were necessarily less “blocky” in appearance because of the random noise used 
to generate them (see Figure 2). This would act to reduce the magnitude of any prototype effect in 
these experiments, and so our model is necessarily overestimating the size of the prototype effect 
actually obtained. Even given this, however, we can see that a prototype effect might be hard to 
detect for the two category case under our control conditions. 
We can now look at the expected generalisation for the three category problem. This is shown 
in the 3 Categories MKM column, and gives a difference of .222 (= .395 - .173) for the prototype and 
.104 (= .526 - .422) for the exemplar. Clearly this is a larger disparity between prototype and exemplar 
generalisation (.118) than we had for the two category case (.077 where the values for the prototype 
and exemplars were .256 and .179), and as such could lead to a stronger prototype effect. We took k 
for the three category task to not necessarily be the same as in the two category task, and arrived at a 
value of 10. Clearly training on three categories rather than two might, in itself, affect the weight 
placed on the measure provided by generalisation (not least because as the number of categories 
increases so does total generalisation between them), but note that using the same value for k as in 
the two category case (i.e.11) leads to essentially the same pattern of results with this simple model of 
choice. The choice equation now becomes: 
2. 𝑃 𝐴 =  !!"!!"! !!" ! !!" 
This resulted in P(A) for the prototypes being 0.82 (which is somewhat too high), and P(A) for 
exemplars being 0.59 (which is too low), but represents a reasonable fit to the data and clearly makes 
the point that the prototype effect for the three category problem is predicted to be much greater than 
for the two category problem (a difference of 0.82 - 0.59 = 0.23 compared to a difference of 0.06 in 
the two category problem). It is no surprise on this analysis, then, that the prototype effect might be 
detectable in our controls for the three category, but not the two category problem. 
If we now consider the effect of turning off error-based modulation of salience to give 
something like the representation development that would be seen using the M&R model, then a quite 
different pattern emerges. First of all, generalisation increases a great deal – as can be seen by 
looking in the two M&R columns of Table 3. This is exactly as would be expected given that 
perceptual learning (which has effectively been switched off) has the opposite effect to generalisation. 
The increased generalisation for the two category problem gives difference scores of 1 - .654 = .346 
for the prototype and .754 - .558 = .196 for exemplars. The difference score for the prototype has 
improved relative to the .256 difference obtained using MKM, whereas the score for the exemplars 
has stayed about the same (it was .179). The prediction, then, is that the prototype effect should be 
enhanced by anodal tDCS in the two category case, as the disparity between prototype and exemplar 
difference scores is now .150 instead of the original .077. Translating the generalisation scores into 
choice probabilities requires that we make a new estimate of k here, as clearly tDCS could quite 
possibly have affected the weight placed on our measure of category membership in ways not 
captured by our model. A value of k = 8 gives us P(A) for the prototype as 0.94 and P(A) for 
exemplars as 0.82 in the two category problem, which is a good fit to our data and suggests that the 
size of the predicted effect has doubled. If we instead consider what happens for the three category 
problem then a different effect emerges. The original disparity between the generalisation differences 
for MKM was .118 (.222 - .104), but once we turn off error-based modulation it becomes .085 (.328 - 
.243). Clearly both generalisation scores have increased, but the increase has been greater for the 
exemplars and so the difference is smaller, and smaller still relative to the scores contributing to that 
difference. Translating these scores into choice probabilities we used a value for k of 5 to try and fit 
our data as best we could, which results in choice probabilities of 0.72 (too high) for the prototype and 
0.63 (too low) for the exemplars. Clearly, this simple model of choice had considerable difficulty in 
fitting our data. But this exercise makes the important point that once again the changes in 
generalisation - which are all we are confident of in this modelling exercise (and even here we have 
caveats about the similarity of our prototypes to the exemplars) - do translate into changes in choice 
probability which fit the interaction in our data. In this case the predicted prototype effect, which was 
23%, has now decreased to 9% indicating that it should become considerably more difficult to detect. 
 One point that may strike the reader about our analysis is that this final prototype effect for 
the three category problem under tDCS (an effect of 9%) is not so different to the effect of 12% 
predicted for the two category problem under tDCS which we wish to claim is detectable. The 
important points to make here are that first, the two effects occur at different levels of choice 
probability. A 12% difference when choice is in the 80%-90% range will have a lower variability 
associated with it than a difference of 9% when choice probabilities are 60%-70%. Thus one may be 
detectable where the other is not. Second, we have tried to emphasize that it is the change in effect 
from control stimulation to experimental (anodal) stimulation that is the real prediction of interest here. 
We cannot (and do not wish to) lay claim to possessing a model that fits (in the statistical sense) our 
data, but we can claim that the changes in generalisation that occur in our model as a result of shifting 
from two category to three category problems, and as a result of switching off perceptual learning, 
accurately capture the pattern in our data. And this suggests a particular interpretation for the effects 
of anodal tDCS stimulation of DLPFC. 
The real test of our position, of course, would be to look directly at the effects of anodal tDCS 
stimulation on perceptual learning. We are now able to unequivocally predict that this stimulation 
should disrupt perceptual learning and possibly even reverse it. We will now briefly consider a set of 
experiments that addresses this issue, using the same set of chequerboard stimuli and the design 
employed by Civile et al (2014) to look at perceptual learning in the context of inversion effects. 
 
Perceptual Learning 
We have already noted that perceptual learning affects the way we see the world and the 
objects in it, and that pre-exposure to stimuli enhances our ability to discriminate among or between 
them or other similar stimuli. In the lab, one of the most striking consequences of perceptual learning 
is the face inversion effect: upright faces are better recognised than inverted faces. This inversion 
effect is at least partly due to our extensive experience with faces, as exposure to artificial stimulus 
sets that have a structure akin to that possessed by faces leads to phenomena similar to those 
observed in face recognition, including inversion effects (McLaren, 1997; Gauthier and Tarr, 1997). 
For example, exposure to a set of prototype-defined chequerboards results in an inversion effect for 
exemplars from a familiar category but not for exemplars from a novel (not pre-exposed) category 
(McLaren, 1997, Civile et al, 2014). As we have already argued, this advantage for upright exemplars 
can be explained by associative models of perceptual learning that rely on differential latent inhibition 
of common elements. Exposure to exemplars from the familiar category leads to latent inhibition of the 
prototypical elements for that category (Figure 1, top half). When an exemplar drawn from that 
category is encountered, the elements that it shares with the prototype will be latently inhibited 
(making them less salient), whereas the elements that are unique to that exemplar will not suffer 
greatly from latent inhibition (making them more salient). This will enhance discrimination between 
exemplars drawn from the familiar category (i.e. perceptual learning). Our associative model can 
explain a range of perceptual learning phenomena, including the inversion effect, as the latent 
inhibition mechanism only applies to what has been experienced, and participants have not 
experienced inverted exemplars during the earlier familiarization phase. Figure 1 (bottom half) also 
shows that losing the modulatory component producing differential latent inhibition should result in a 
loss and perhaps even a reversal of within-category perceptual learning. 
Our plan, then, was to run what was essentially a replication of Civile et al (2014), but to apply 
anodal tDCS using our current electrode montage during the first, categorisation phase. This should 
disrupt any perceptual learning and increase generalisation between exemplars. Because perceptual 
learning is responsible for the inversion effect for exemplars drawn from a familiar category (i.e. one 
that has been trained) that we reliably see with this procedure, anodal tDCS should reduce (perhaps 
even reverse) this effect. The detailed results of these experiments will be reported elsewhere (Civile, 
Verbruggen, McLaren, Zhao, Ku and McLaren, in preparation) so we will only summarise them here. 
We used the same 16x16 chequerboards used in the earlier experiments with the addition of one 
extra category, D. Our experimental groups used anodal stimulation. The control groups used sham 
or cathodal stimulation. Participants classified exemplars from two prototype-defined chequerboard 
categories during tDCS (categorisation stage). They then studied exemplars drawn both from one of 
the now familiar categories and from another novel category in either upright or inverted orientations 
(study stage). Finally, in the recognition task (test stage) they had to classify chequerboards as either 
“old” (seen in the study phase) or “new” (not seen). Their accuracy scores were then converted into d' 
measures for use in our analyses.  
In Figure 9 we give the combined Anodal stimulation vs. Control results for recognition in this 
final phase. As predicted by extrapolation from the Civile et al (2014) experiments and the results 
considered earlier, in the Control conditions we observed an inversion effect for familiar-category 
exemplars (Upright better than Inverted, p = .013) but not for novel-category exemplars. The 
perceptual learning effect was also reflected in the performance on upright exemplars taken from the 
familiar category being better (p=.050) than that on the matched exemplars (matched across 
participants) taken from the novel category. But under anodal stimulation the pattern was quite 
different. There was no inversion effect, and the effect that was there was significantly different to that 
in controls (p=.045). Now the performance on upright exemplars taken from the familiar category was 
significantly worse (p=.005) than that on the matched exemplars taken from the novel category. In 
fact, if we compare performance on the upright exemplars taken from the familiar category in both 
conditions, the difference is also highly significant (p=.005), and in favour of the controls. Clearly the 
effects of familiarisation with the category have radically altered under anodal stimulation. 
Figure 9 about here please 
The most reasonable interpretation of these results is that Anodal tDCS has a selective effect 
on performance to upright exemplars drawn from the familiar category. We would argue that our data 
are consistent with anodal tDCS stimulation eliminating a modulatory input based on prediction error, 
leading to a loss of perceptual learning. The resultant system is then adequately described by simple 
delta rule algorithms of the type found in the M&R model of categorisation, and as such has a 
particular problem in dealing with familiar prototype-defined categories as a consequence of the 
increased generalisation between their exemplars. This leads to the poor performance on the upright 
exemplars drawn from the familiar category under anodal tDCS, compared to the otherwise superior 
performance exhibited to these exemplars under control conditions as predicted by MKM.  
Conclusions 
In Experiment 1 we were able to demonstrate that anodal tDCS to left DLPFC does indeed 
reduce the prototype effect that might otherwise be obtained after learning to categorise. This 
confirms the result of Ambrus et al (2011), and suggests that their result was not simply a matter of 
anodal tDCS reducing learning per se. We carried out Experiment 2 in order to set the stage for our 
subsequent investigation of perceptual learning and to confirm the results of Experiment 1. Our results 
were, on the face of it, anything but confirmation of Experiment1, in that far from reducing the 
prototype effect, anodal tDCS enhanced it. In fact, it produced a significant effect where under control 
conditions none had been detectable.  
This initially surprising and contradictory result proved to be susceptible to a detailed analysis 
in terms of changes in generalisation brought about by 1) changing the number of categories from 
three to two and 2) using either anodal or control stimulation. The analysis relied on the assumption 
that the effect of anodal tDCS to left DLPFC was to disrupt modulation of the salience of stimulus 
representations based on error such as to transform a system for categorisation that under control 
conditions could be described by MKM, to one better thought of in terms of M&R. This effect 
interacted with the increased generalisation between categories that occurred in the three category 
problem relative to the two category version, and so explained the different effects of anodal tDCS on 
the prototype effect in the different experiments. Our analysis is model-driven, and admittedly post-
hoc, but it did make the prediction that perceptual learning due to pre-exposure during categorisation 
training should be eliminated, or even reversed, by anodal stimulation.  
This prediction was fully borne out by the results of the final set of experiments reported here. 
Our control conditions showed our usual inversion effect in this analogue of the face recognition 
paradigm using chequerboards, but the inversion effect was not present under anodal tDCS. More 
importantly, whilst familiarisation with a category improved performance on upright exemplars drawn 
from that category, in that they were better discriminated in the old/new test than those drawn from a 
novel category, this effect was reversed under anodal stimulation. Finally, performance on the upright 
exemplars from the familiar category was significantly and selectively worse under anodal tDCS than 
in the control conditions, an effect entirely consistent with our hypothesis that anodal stimulation 
"turns off" perceptual learning and leaves participants with greatly increased generalisation. 
Final Thoughts 
The McLaren, Kaye and Mackintosh theory of latent inhibition and perceptual learning could, 
up until now, be seen as an abstract connectionist model of representation development that provided 
a good account of a fairly limited domain of animal and human behaviour. But the intention on the 
original author's part was always to apply it more widely, and that is a challenge that we have taken 
up with our recent research into categorisation and perceptual learning. We now have some hints 
about the neural mechanisms underlying perceptual learning, and they fit very well within the 
framework provided by that theory. This serves to remind us that Nick Mackintosh's vision in 
extrapolating from sophisticated behavioural experiments to detailed theoretical mechanisms was 
quite extraordinary, and his theoretical insights into perceptual learning in humans are as relevant 
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Figure and Table Legends: 
Table 1: This shows the percentage of features of different types (elements) present in each of four 
different stimuli drawn from two different categories. Each element label refers to Figure 7 
(middle and rightmost panels) and denotes features that are present in one or more of the three 
possible categories. The table also makes clear the extent of feature overlap between any two 
stimuli once it is born in mind that exemplars are generated from the prototypes by randomly 
changing the elements of the prototype, and that 25% is the maximum allocation of elements of 
any one type. 
Table 2: This shows the expected generalisation (minimum=0, maximum=1) between each of the four 
stimuli in the table and a typical trained exemplar drawn from Category A. Generalisation is 
calculated using either the MKM or M&R salience for the elements comprising the stimulus. 
Note that the generalisation from A exemplars to the C prototype will be the same as that 
expected for the C exemplars to the A prototype, and so can be used in conjunction with the 
figures for the A prototype to calculate the probability of labelling prototype A as a member of 
the A category. 
Figure 1: Top half. This illustrates how modulation driven by prediction error (as in MKM) can be used 
to influence feature salience for a single category. The result, shown in the temperature 
diagram, is that stimulus features that are more predictable become less active (darker 
shading) leading to latent inhibition (slower learning as a consequence of pre-exposure). This 
improves discrimination between members of a prototype-defined category as it relies upon the 
less predictable features unique to each stimulus. The bottom half of the figure shows how 
disrupting this modulatory input (e.g. using tDCS) reverses this effect (as in M&R), making the 
common, prototypical features of the stimuli the most salient (lighter shading). 
Figure 2: Examples of the prototypes (top row) and exemplars (bottom row) from the categories used 
in the experiments reported in this paper. Please see the text and Civile, Zhao, Ku, Elchlepp, 
Lavric and McLaren (2014) for more details about the characteristics of our prototype-defined 
categories of chequerboards. 
Figure 3: The figure illustrates the electrode configuration and the tDCS apparatus used in these 
experiments. 
Figure 4: Average accuracy for each group (Anodal, Cathodal, Sham) broken down to show overall 
performance during training and then test performance to exemplars and prototypes. Error bars 
are SE of the mean. 
Figure 5.  The difference in response accuracy between prototypes and the average of responding to 
exemplars in the test phase of the experiment. Error bars are SE of the mean. 
Figure 6: The graph shows mean accuracy during test for old and new exemplars drawn from the 
trained categories as well as performance on the prototypes for those categories. The 
chequerboards shown are typical exemplars / the prototype for the A category, but the average 
is for both categories. Error bars show SE of the mean. 
Figure 7: The graph gives mean accuracy for old and new exemplars as well as the prototypes during 
test based on performance on both categories. This time the figure displays typical exemplars / 
the prototype for the C category. 
Figure 8: Top Panels: This illustrates how modulation driven by prediction error (as in MKM) can be 
used to influence feature salience. The result, shown in the temperature diagram, is that 
stimulus features that are more predictable become less active (darker shading) leading to 
latent inhibition (slower learning as a consequence of pre-exposure). This improves 
discrimination between members of a prototype-defined category as it relies upon the less 
predictable features unique to each stimulus. The bottom panels show how removing this 
modulatory input (as in M&R) reverses this effect, making the prototypical features of the stimuli 
the most salient (lighter shading). The two category case (centre) where exposure is only to A 
and C categories, and the three category case (right) are illustrated in terms of the prototypes 
for each category, and are labelled to show the differential effect on the elements that make up 
each category prototype. 
Figure 9: Combined results of perceptual learning experiments. Lighter bars are for Anodal stimulation 
and darker bars for control stimulation. The y-axis gives d' scores for the old/new recognition 








Stimulus Elements a ab ac abc bc b c n 
A prototype % 25 25 25 25 0 0 0 0 
A exemplar % 20 20 20 20 5 5 5 5 
C prototype % 0 0 25 25 25 0 25 0 
C exemplar % 5 5 20 20 20 5 20 5 
 Table 2 
 
  








A prototype .596 1.00 .395 1.00 
A exemplar .609 .754 .526 .761 
C prototype .340 .654 .173 .672 
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